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ARGUMENT
1. Marshaling of Evidence:
Appellee first states that Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence
regarding specific findings of facts, but Appellee's argument is misplaced.
The obligation to marshal the evidence objecting to a specific finding of fact
is certainly a burden which must be borne when an appellant is contesting
specific findings of fact. See, State v. Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2000):
To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the
defendant "must first marshal all the evidence that supports the
trial court's findings. After marshaling the supportive
evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial
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court's findings. (Also quoted in State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d
1278 (Utah 2001)
In the case at bar, Appellant does not contest or argue with any of the
trial court's findings of fact, but rather, appeals the trial court's refusal to set
aside the default judgment arising from the failure of Appellant to "arrange a
mutually convenient time to meet regarding a discovery plan." (transcript, p
148).
In Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 47 P.3d 76 (Utah App.,
2001), an unlawful detainer case, appellee Potter argues that appellant fails
to marshal the evidence. The appellate court states:
Potter next argues the Dishingers . . . have also failed to
marshal the evidence. . .. Moreover, the marshaling
requirement applies only when challenging findings of fact,
[citation omitted] Clearly, the Dishingers are not challenging
findings of fact. Rather, they are challenging the trial court's
application of the law to the jury's special verdict findings and
thus the Dishingers do not have the burden of marshaling the
evidence. Id. at paragraph 30
As there is no contest in the matter at bar regarding the facts of the
case and there is no reference to the Findings of Fact entered by the Court,
there is no need by Appellant to marshal the evidence either in support of or
against the factual record in this matter. Hence, Appellee's argument is
specious and without any argumentative value.
2. Jurisdiction:
3

For Appellee's second and last argument, Appellee argues that the
Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction in this matter due to an untimely appeal
by Appellant.
a. Pertinent Dates:
i. The final judgment in this case was entered on
December 17, 2003. Appellee's Brief, pg 15, third paragraph)
ii. Appellant timely filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment on February 10, 2004 which is within
the ninety (90) days provided in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b).
iii. The trial court denied Appellant's Rule 60 (b) motion
on April 5, 2004.
iv. This appeal from the Court's ruling of April 5, 2004.
was filed on May 5, 2004.
b. Timeliness: Appellee states that Appellant's Motion for
Reconsideration (filed on October 20, 2003 in response to Appellee's
proposed and unsigned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) was filed
after the time for Notice of Appeal expired. Appellee's argument is in
error, as Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration was disposed of by the trial
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Appellee further misstates the facts by erroneously claiming that
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the thirty days allowed for
filing an appeal after the entry of a final judgment. As stated, the Final
Judgment wv* nik/inl i Daniilin I \ .'Oli.i
to set aside judgment was filed fo •' - limit ^ \
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allowed by Rule 60(b) and the Notice of Appeal was timely filed within
thirty (30) days following the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.
1 Iii fJotice of Appeal is timely under two separate scenarios in this
i: natter.
i. The Notice of A ppeal is cleai 1> Ill i lely ' itl I i espect to the
trial court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the
judgment

Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide whether

I he trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the
judgn lei it of Decei i ibei 17. 2003.
ii. ' I he Notice of Appeal is arguably timely with respect to the
judgment rendered on December 17, 2003. Four Utah cases speak
directly to the matter:
\

A Rule 60(b) Motion Stays the Time for Filing an Appeal:
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a. Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Gerber, 526 P.2d
1121 (Utah, 1974) states
The timely filing of any of the motions allowed by
the rules to attack or change the findings and judgment
invokes the continuing jurisdiction of the court and
suspends the running of the time on the judgment until
the motion is ruled upon. l Id. at 1124.
b. Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950 (Utah, 1989) states:
If Schettler believed the trial court erred in denying his
first motion to set aside the default judgment, the
appropriate remedy was by direct appeal within the
prescribed 30-day period. Schettler chose instead to file
a second post-judgment motion and the time for filing a
notice of appeal with this Court on his first 60(b) motion
continued to run. Id. at 970.
B. A Rule 60(b) Motion Does Not Stay the Time for Filing an
Appeal:
a. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah, 1987)
states:
Treating the motion under Rule 60(b)(1) or (7)
likewise does not save this appeal and prevents us from
reaching the merits of the trial court's original order. A
Rule 60(b) motion does not extend or toll the thirty-day
period in which appeals in the original action must be
filed. Id. at 1319.
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b. >.ttrwrv. Schrieverl V,M\ H/ 11 H.ih , 21II10) states:
1he court of appeals correctly observed that a
motion filed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
"does not extend or toll the thirty-day period in which
appeals in the original action must be filed." Id. at 446.
There appears to be somewhat of a conflict regarding whether a Rule
60(b) motion stays the time for filing an appeal from a final judgment.

Rule 60(b) motion does i

i

.

* -,

if a party is allowed ninety days under Rule 60(b) to file a motion to set
aside a judgment and the motion is denied, justice is denied to the movant if
the movant is precluded from filing an appeal of the final judgment under

if the Rule 60(b) motion is granted.
successful Rule 60(b) ruling stays the time for appeal but an unsuccessful
Rule 60(b) ruling does not stay the time for the appeal.
Tl lei efoi e, in order to assure constancy in application of the rules,
Apprlhnl ni"i?cs (his < 'omul Iiu ,i<lopl
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whether successful or unsuccessful, stays the time for filing an appeal from a
final judgment.

1

While a footnote only refers to Rule 59(b), Rule 60 should be applicable since it is a rule "allowed by the
rules to attack, or change the . . . judgment
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CONCLUSION
Appellee's Brief consists of two concise arguments, which, if they
applied to the case at bar, would be considered well argued. However, as
Appellant does not contest the Findings of Fact in this matter, only the lower
court's refusal to set aside a default judgment, there is no necessity for
Appellant to marshal the facts and evidence.
Second, Appellee's argument that the Court of Appeals lacks
jurisdiction is unsupported by the facts or the law. The Notice of Appeal of
the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion which is a final, appealable order, was
timely filed following the lower court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b)
motion.
Finally, by concentrating on the two above arguments which have no
application in this matter, Appellee has failed to respond to Appellant's
arguments in chief regarding the lower court's abuse of discretion. As
argued in its case in chief, the lower court's entry of a default judgment
based upon the failure of Appellant's counsel to arrange for a discovery
conference is a clear abuse of discretion. The sanction of a default
judgment is extremely harsh, is not favored in the law and should not be
approved by this Court. The lower court may have been justified in
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granting sanctions of attorneys' fees or a civil fine, but to throw the case out
of court for failure to initiate a telephone call is much too harsh for our
modern practice.
Therefore, as there is no opposition to Appellant's arguments
presented in its initial brief, Appellant prays that the appeal be granted as
prayed and that Appellant be granted its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
presenting this reply brief.

ROBERT D. ROSE
Attorney for Appellant
PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
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159 West

300 South

Suite 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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